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Abstract
This is a variation of the two-sided market model of [10]: Demand
D is concave in D˜ in (16) of [10]. So, in (5) of [10] and after Theorem
2, take the parametric case 0 < a ≤ 1. Thus, demand D is both
decreasing and concave in price p, and so the utilities (U = pD)
are also concave in price. Also, herein a simpler illustrative demand-
response model is used in Appendix A and B.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a game between an Internet Service (access)
Provider (ISP) and content provider (CP) on a platform of end-user demand.
A price-concave demand-response is motivated based on the delay-sensitive
applications that are expected to be subjected to the assumed usage-priced
∗This research was supported by NSF CNS grant 1116626.
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priority service over best-effort service. Thus, we are considering a two-sided
market with multiclass demand wherein one class (that under considera-
tion herein) is delay-sensitive. Both the Internet and proposed Information
Centric Network (ICN, encompassing Content Centric Networking (CCN))
scenarios are considered. For our purposes, the ICN case is basically different
in the polarity of the side-payment (from ISP to CP in an ICN) and, more
importantly here, in that content caching by the ISP is incented.
Pricing congestible commodities have been extensively studied. For ex-
ample, in [7] a demand model is is based on a “cost” that is the sum of a price
and latency term. We herein take this relationship to be an implicit one in
which the latency factor is also an increasing function of demand. The result-
ing price-concave demand-response model is extended to account for content
caching. The corresponding Nash equilibria are derived as a function of the
caching factor.
2 Problem Set-Up: The Internet model
Suppose there are two providers, one content (CP indexed 2) and the other
access (ISP indexed 1), with common consumer demand-response [6]1. First
suppose that the demand response to price is linear:
D = Dmax − d(p1 + p2), (1)
where d is demand sensitivity to the price, p1 and p2 are, respectively, the
prices charged by the ISP and CP, and Dmax > 0 is the demand at zero usage
based price2. Suppose the revenue of the ISP is
U1 = (p1 + ps)D, (2)
where ps is the side payment from content to access provider. Similarly, the
revenue of the CP is
U2 = (p2 − ps)D. (3)
1Leader-follower dynamics, rather than simultaneous play at the same time-scale, are
considered in [11]. For the problem setting of this paper, leader-follower dynamics were
considered by us in [1] and provider competition in [4, 9].
2Note that ISPs are continuing to depart from pure flat-rate pricing (based on maximum
access bandwidth) for unlimited monthly volume, e.g., [12, 3].
Figure 1: ISP and CP game on a platform of end-user demand-response
Consider a noncooperative game played by the CP and ISP adjusting their
prices, respectively p2 and p1, to maximize their respective revenues, with
all other parameters fixed. In particular, the fixed side-payment ps is here
assumed regulated. Note that the utilities are linear functions of ps so that
if ps were under the control of one of the players, ps would simply be set at
an extremal value.
The following simple result was shown in [1, 4].
Theorem 1. The interior Nash equilibrium3 is
p∗1 =
Dmax
3d
− ps and p∗2 =
Dmax
3d
+ ps
when
|ps| < Dmax
3d
, (4)
3In this paper, we do not consider boundary Nash equilibria, where at least one player
is selecting an extremal value for one of their control parameters, often resulting in that
player essentially opting out of the game, or maximally profiting from it at the expense of
the other player. The boundary equilibria are also specified in [1].
with player utilities
U∗1 , U
∗
2 =
D2max
9d
.
Note that this result allows ps < 0, i.e., net side payment is from ISP
to CP (remuneration for content instead of access bandwidth). But in the
Internet setting, we take ps > 0, whether there is direct side-payment from
CP to ISP (or, again, indirectly by payment through the peering contract
between the residential ISP and the ISP of the CP - a contract that penalizes
for asymmetric traffic exchange neutrally based on aggregate traffic volume).
In [4, 8], we showed that the ISP may actually experience a reduction in
revenue/utility with the introduction of side payments, using a communal
demand model that had different demand-sensitivity-to-price parameters d
per provider type and also multiple providers of each type (i.e., provider
competition). Such a model was also considered in [2].
Consider a concave demand response to price, e.g.,
D =
(
1
Dmax − (p1 + p2)d + a
)−1
, a ≥ 0, (5)
where
pmax = Dmax/d when a = 0.
The following is a simple extension of Theorem 1 accommodating (5).
Theorem 2. For utilities (2) and (3), the interior Nash equilibrium for a
strictly concave demand response D is
p∗1 + ps = p
∗/2 = p∗2 − ps, (6)
where p∗ = p∗1 + p
∗
2 solves
D(p∗) +D′(p∗)p∗/2 = 0. (7)
and |ps| < p∗/2.
For the example of (5) with a ≥ 0,
p∗ =
4aDmax + 3−
√
8aDmax + 9
4ad
(8)
Note that simply by L’Hopital’s rule, lima→0 p∗ = 23Dmax/d =
2
3
pmax, which is
consistent with Theorem 1. Again, under communal demand response with
only one provider of each type, neither p∗ = p∗1 + p
∗
2 nor U
∗
1 depend on the
side payment ps. In an illustrative example of Appendix A, the parameter
a = (B − λ)−1,
where B is a possibly congested bandwidth resource, parameter 0 ≤ λ < B,
and demand D ≤ min{B − λ,Dmax}.
3 ICN model
Again, in an ICN, residential users request content (or, more generally, infor-
mation regarding application services) of the ISP/resolver, and the ISP/resolver
decides the content provider. Therefore in an ICN, it’s reasonable to assume
that the side-payment is from ISP to CP, i.e., ps < 0. Also, the ISP is moti-
vated to cache content, unlike for our simple Internet case, to reduce the side
payment (i.e., avoid paying for, e.g., the networking costs of the ISP-selected
CP to transmit the user-requested content). Suppose that the ISP decides
to cache a fraction κ of the content and this results in lower delay between
the CP and ISP, and a lower required side-payment to the CP, cf., (9). If
we model mean delay as 1/(B − D) [13], where B is the service capacity
between CP and ISP, then with caching factor κ, this delay is reduced to
1/(B − (1− κ)D). For the models of Appendix B, the demand response:
• is increasing in caching factor κ,
• is concave in price for κ ∈ [0, 1), and
• tends to linear in price (1) as κ→ 1.
In an illustrative example of Appendix B, the demand parameter in (5) is
a = (1− κ)(B − λ)−1.
Note that neither Dmax nor pmax are assumed dependent on κ. Because of
ISP caching, the ISP and CP utilities generalize to
U1 = (p1 + (1− κ)ps)D − c(κ), (9)
U2 = (p2 − (1− κ)ps)D,
again with ps < 0, where c(κ) is the cost of caching borne by the ISP. In
Appendix C, we argue that c is convex in κ.
Note that the caching cost c component of U1 does not depend on p2 or
p1, and |ps| < p∗/2 implies |(1 − κ)ps| < p∗/2. So, we can use the results of
Theorem 2 and (8) here, with parameters (1−κ)ps and a = (1−κ)(B−λ)−1
instead of ps and a = (B − λ)−1, respectively, to obtain the utilities U∗1 , U∗2
at Nash equilibrium, p∗1, p
∗
2. We can then consider how U
∗
1 , U
∗
2 depend on the
caching factor κ.
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Appendix A: Explanation of concave demand
response
Consider a price-concave demand response D˜. In particular, for price p ∈
[0, pmax], consider the linear case let
D˜(p) := Dmax − pd = Dmax(1− p/pmax) ≥ 0. (10)
Suppose that the demand D satisfies
D = [g(D)D˜]+,
where g is a decreasing and concave factor, not dependent of price, accounting
for demand loss due to congestion. For example [10],
g(D) =
1− λ/(B −D)
1− λ/B ,
where the term 1/(B − D) is taken from the queueing delay of an M/M/1
queue with mean arrival rate D and mean service rate B > D [13]. More
simply, we can take
g(D) =
B − λ−D
B − λ , (11)
where B is the available bandwidth resource, and parameter 0 ≤ λ < B.
Note that for these examples:
• g(0) = 1,
• g(B − λ) = 0, so that
• 0 ≤ D ≤ min{B − λ,Dmax}, and
• g is non-negative, decreasing and concave.
Lemma 1. If D = g(D)D˜ > 0 with g nonnegative, decreasing and concave
and D˜ ≥ 0, then D is increasing and concave in D˜.
Proof. Let g′ = dg/dD and D′ = dD/dD˜. By direct differentiation with
respect to D˜:
D′ = g + D˜g′D′
⇒ D′ = g
1− D˜g′ ≥ 0
⇒ D′′ = (1− D˜g
′)g′ + (D˜g′′ + g′)g
(1− D˜g′)2 D
′ ≤ 0,
Corollary 1. Under Lemma 1 and if D˜ is decreasing and concave in price p,
then D is non-negative and decreasing in p, and both D and pD are concave
in p.
Proof. By the above lemma, D(D˜) ≥ 0 is increasing and concave. Again, by
direct differentiation:
∂D(D˜)
∂p
= D′(D˜)
∂D˜
∂p
≤ 0
∂2D(D˜)
∂p2
= D′′(D˜)
(
∂D˜
∂p
)2
+D′(D˜)
∂2D˜
∂p2
≤ 0
For linear demand-response to price (10) and the linear congestion factor
(11),
D(p) = (D˜(p)−1 + (B − λ)−1)−1 (12)
= (B − λ)
(
1− 1
1 + (Dmax − dp)/(B − λ)
)
which is decreasing and concave in p, with
D(0) = (D−1max + (B − λ)−1)−1 ≤ min{B − λ, Dmax}.
It’s also easy to see that
lim
B→∞, p→0
D = Dmax.
Appendix B: Explanation of demand increas-
ing in caching factor
As a result of ISP caching, only a fraction (1 − κ) of the demand D is
transmitted through the the bandwidth B between ISP and CP. So, the
congestion factor (11) is modified to
gκ(D) =
B − λ− (1− κ)D
B − λ
=
(B − λ)/(1− κ)−D
(B − λ)/(1− κ)
So, solving D = D˜gκ(D) results in (12) with B−λ replaced by (B−λ)/(1−κ):
D(p) = (D˜(p)−1 + (1− κ)(B − λ)−1)−1. (13)
Thus, if positive κ < 1, the demand is concave in price p and increasing in
κ. On the other hand, as κ→ 1, the demand tends to linear in price (1).
Lemma 2. Generally, if the congestion factor g is a decreasing function,
then the demand D increases with caching factor κ.
Proof. First note that gκ(D) = g0((1 − κ)D) := g((1 − κ)D), is decreasing
in (1− κ)D (hence increasing in caching factor κ). Consider the solution
Dκ = D˜gκ(Dκ) (14)
and note that Dκ ≥ D0. Now,
D0 = D˜g0(D0) < D˜g0((1− κ)D0) = D˜gκ(D0).
So, if Dκ ≤ D0, then we would have
Dκ ≤ D0 < D˜gκ(D0) ≤ D˜gκ(Dκ),
which contradicts the definition of Dκ in (14).
Appendix C: Convexity of cost of caching as a
function of caching factor
Assume that the cost of caching is proportional to the number of cached items
(content), in turn proportional to the (mean) amount of memory required
to store them. For a fixed population of N end-users (a proximal group
served by an ISP), let pi(j) be the proportion of the items that will soon
be of interest to precisely j end-users. Finally, suppose the ISP naturally
prioritizes its cache to hold the most popular content. So, a “caching factor”
κ, based on all-or-none decisions to cache content of the same popularity,
would satisfy
κ ∝
N∑
j=N−f(κ)
jpi(j).
for some f(κ) ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N}. The cost of caching would be proportional
to the number of cached items, i.e.,
c(κ) ∝
N∑
j=N−f(κ)
pi(j).
Suppose that the great majority of potentially desired content is only min-
imally popular, i.e., pi(j) is decreasing4 We now argue that the caching cost
4Note that this general assumption obviously accommodates the empirically observed
Zipf distribution for content popularity, e.g., [5].
c(κ) is convex and increasing for the simplified continuous scenario ignoring
the (positive) constants of proportionality:
κ =
∫ N
N−f(κ)
zpi(z)dz and c(κ) =
∫ N
N−f(κ)
pi(z)dz,
with c(0) = 0 and c(1) = 1. By differentiating successively, we get
1 = (N − f(κ))pi(N − f(κ))f ′(κ) (15)
c′(κ) = pi(N − f(κ))f ′(κ)
⇒ 1 = (N − f(κ))c′(κ)
⇒ c′′(κ) = f ′(κ)(N − f(κ))−2 (16)
Note that f ′ > 0 by (15) and therefore c′′ > 0 by (16).
